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Abstract
In New York City, as in the nation, blue-collar
employment is losing ground to white-collar, factories to
offices. Since office jobs are concentrated in Manhattan,
there is a growing disparity of employment opportunity
between Manhattan and the outer boroughs of New York City.
Moreover, this spatial disparity is compounded by an
immense skill disparity: office jobs are ill-suited to New
York's huge blue-collar labor force. The continuing loss
of manufacturing jobs, nonetheless, has caused many to look
to office development as the only potential source of new
jobs in the outer boroughs. These outer boroughs are
thought to be in competition with the suburbs primarily for
back office functions that are priced out of the Manhattan
office market.
We designed an empirical analysis of the determinants
of office location in the suburbs of New York City. Such a
study, we thought, could help us judge the ability of the
outer boroughs to attract office development. We sought to
explain the variations in office rents across towns by cost
factors, and by amenity factors. Do rents vary across
towns because the costs of office development vary, or
because the amenities of the towns vary? We hypothesized
that since the supply of office space is fixed in the short
run, demand for various amenities would bid up rents in
some towns more than others. The results of our analysis
were consistent with our hypothesis: amenity factors
predicted rents much better than did cost factors. We
suggest that long-term rent differentials across towns can
best be explained if one assumes a monopolistically
competitive office market. We interpret our findings in
the context of other important theoretical and empirical
research on office location.
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What consequence do these findings have for New York
City's efforts to stimulate office development in the outer
boroughs? The amenity orientation of office location poses
dilemmas for the city in that those locations most
attractive to developers are also those locations least in
need of development. Finally, we argue that only by
reducing the fiscal and political balkanization of the
region will New York be able to divert office development
from Manhattan to the depressed business districts of the
outer boroughs.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen Polenske
Title: Professor
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I. The Transition and Its Consequences
The office building has come to replace the
factory as the symyol of contemporary urban
economic development.
New York City's economic problems remain severe. From
1950-1980, the city lost 540,000, or one-half, of its
manufacturing jobs. Of the 558,000 net job loss from 1970-
1977, 227,000 were in manufacturing. By contrast, there
was a net gain of 111,000 jobs from 1977-1980, despite a
loss of 40,000 manufacturing jobs during this period.2
This fledgling recovery, after a catastrophic loss of jobs
during the early 1970s, was due almost entirely to growth
in business and professional services -- that is, office
jobs. Since 1977, the growth of office employment has
exceeded the decline in manufacturing employment.
More important than the simple net employment gain is
the profound transformation of the New York economy from
manufacturing to office employment. One important
consequence of this long-term structural change is a
growing disparity of employment opportunity between
Manhattan and the four outer boroughs of Staten Island, the
Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens. Because Manhattan dominates
the service, finance, insurance, and real estate industries
in New York City, the partial job recovery from 1977-1980
was limited to Manhattan. Private sector employment rose
6.5 percent during this period in Manhattan, but less than
1.0 percent in the rest of the city. Worse, in the poorest
boroughs of Brooklyn and the Bronx, private sector
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employment actually declined. 3 Since manufacturing jobs
are much more evenly distributed throughout the city than
are office jobs, the long-term substitution of office for
manufacturing employment will tend to worsen the economic
disparity between Manhattan and the outer boroughs.
These trends are by no means unique to New York City;
rather, the city is but a dramatic manifestation of a
national economic transformation. Since World War II,
virtually all of the growth in the American economy is due
to an increase in white-collar and service workers, and to
growth in the tertiary industries of trade, finance,
services, transportation, and government. Employment in
the tertiary sector grew from 30.4 million to 57.1 million
jobs over the period 1950-1975, or from 54 percent to 69
percent of the nation's workforce. 4
The national transition from manufacturing to service
employment has significant consequences for the economy of
cities. The centripedal forces that characterize office
location contrast favorably -- from the point of view of
cities -- with the centrifugal forces that characterize
manufacturing. With the flight of manufacturing from
cities to suburbs, and from the Northeast to the Southwest,
many geographers and city officials believe that office
development promises a new economic base for declining
center cities. The concentration and employment density of
offices is thought to be ideally suited to urban land-use
patterns. This is not to say that there has been little
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dispersal of offices; suburbanization of offices, like
suburbanization in general, has been extensive and is more
pronounced in the United States, than in British or
Australian cities. 5 Office migration to the suburbs is
especially dramatic in the case of Fortune 500 Corporation
headquarters. The number of these firms headquartered in
metropolitan areas peaked in 1963 at 71 percent of the
total and declined to 63 percent, or 313 firms, by 1975.6
Still, even with the dramatic growth of suburban office
markets, downtowns in major cities seem to have held their
own: between 1960 and 1975, major downtowns acquired 22
percent of the nationwide net addition of office space,
meaning that they have retained overall a constant share of
23 percent of total national detached office space.7 There
is thus some reason to expect that the growth of the
tertiary sector will strengthen the economic base of major
cities.
It would be misleading, however, simply to survey
aggregate employment measures and conclude that, if overall
employment is growing due to office development, all is
well. As we saw in the case of New York's "recovery"
during 1977-1980, the net increase in employment masked
important disparities: employment declined, for example,
in Brooklyn and the Bronx. A fundamental asymmetry is at
work: the loss of one manufacturing job is by no means
equivalent to a gain of one office job. As a major
manufacturing city, New York was able to provide many
8
middle-income jobs to unskilled working-class people. Now,
as a service economy, the jobs available in New York are
either highly-paid jobs for experienced professionals, or
poorly-paid jobs for clerical personnel (and are typically
held by women). Besides tending to produce a more unequal
distribution of income, the service sector does not offer
potential employment for the enormous number of blue-collar
male workers. 8  A mismatch of immense proportions is
developing because the jobs created are not suited to the
skills of the low-income workforce. The consequences of
this structural mismatch can only worsen as low-income men
enter the labor force without hope of service employment.
One window on the employment consequences of this
transition to a service economy may be the fact that before
1970, New York's unemployment rate was consistently below
the national average, while after 1970, the unemployment
rate has consistently exceeded the national average. The
8.6 percent 1980 jobless rate for New York was one-fifth
higher than the national average; the teenage unemployment
rate in 1980 in New York City was 28.3 percent, while the
national average was 17.7 percent. 9  Some employment
statisticians have dubbed New York "the youth unemployment
capital of the nation." Another window on the employment
consequences of the transition to a service economy is from
a study conducted by the City Office of Economic
Development on commuting patterns to New York. It was
estimated that perhaps 75 percent of the 135,000 office
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jobs created since 1977 are held by commuters, chiefly
middle-aged women. 1 0 Although these new service jobs may
not be suited to blue-collar New York City residents, they
are well-suited to suburban housewives.' 1  Such trends (if
that is what they prove to be) do not bode well either for
the employment prospects of working-class New Yorkers, or
for reducing regional disparities in income.
II. Back-Office Development: Reality or Mirage?
New York City officials view the transformation of the
national economy and its dramatic New York manifestation as
given. These officials, along with many economists and
geographers, define the issue as: How can New York City
benefit most from the growth of the service sector? 1 2 A
recent development in the Manhattan office market poses
vexing policy issues for the economy of New York City. The
years 1980-1982 were the boom phase of the characteristic
boom-bust cycle of office construction. 1 3 Five million
square feet per year were scheduled for construction in
Manhattan from 1980-1985. Demand remained strong through
1982, so that vacancy rates were very low. Consequently,
office rents rose dramatically to $40 per sq. ft and higher
in Midtown Manhattan. As rents continue to increase as a
proportion of operating costs, it becomes increasingly
uneconomic for office support services to pay headquarter
prices. These support services, or back-office functions,
include computer services and data processing, training
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programs, accounting and billing, and check processing.
Several banks and insurance companies have found that they
can split headquarter functions from back-office functions
and then relocate back-office functions to lower-rent
areas. Should this become a trend, it is of concern to
city officials since most of the low-rent office space in
the region is in the suburbs, beyond the tax jurisdiction
of New York City. New York City economic development
officials hope to capture most of the relocated back-office
space in the outer boroughs. Preventing the erosion of the
tax base is the city's first concern, but back-office
development in the outer boroughs is also desired as the
one hope for job growth in the stagnant outer borough
economies.
There are some plausible reasons why back-office
functions might relocate out of Manhattan. Robert M. Haig
argued in 1926 that office activities concentrate in urban
business districts "so as to give the greatest possible
ease of contact among men whose presence is desired in
arriving at decisions." 1 4  Since then, it has become a
commonplace to hold that offices concentrate in order to
allow face-to-face contact among executives, lawyers,
accountants, clients, and other professionals. The
dispersal of offices to the suburbs in the United States
and Europe has led some researchers to qualify the
importance of face-to-face contact. 1 5 Research to uncover
the actual pattern of office communcations confirms the
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importance of face-to-face contact, but only for the top
decision-making positions in a firm. Routine, or back-
office, functions rely almost entirely on telecommuni-
cations, and therefore do not require a center-city
location. A study of firms that relocated from Central
London to its suburbs indicated that such firms have a
higher content of clerical and routine functions than do
firms that remain in the center city.16 The type of job
is, in general, more important than the type of firm in
predicting dispersal.
Despite these plausible reasons to expect back-office
space to relocate out of Manhattan, fluctuations in rents
often remove incentives to relocate. Long-term efficiency
may.require that routine office functions that do not
require a high-rent central location relocate to a lower-
rent peripheral one. But market rents reflect short-run
conditions and do not provide consistent incentives for
achieving long-run efficiency. Given the boom-bust cycle
of the office market, firms will consider relocating back-
office functions when vacancies are low and rents high, but
when rents fall, the incentive to relocate back-office
functions disappears. Since real estate costs are only a
small fraction of total expenses, and since there are costs
associated with moving, firms are not likely to move
support functions unless there is a very substantial rent
saving. Short-term rent fluctuations send conflicting
signals to firms and may hinder the achievement-of long-
12
This phenomenon is especially evident in
the case of energy.
substantial investment
sources of energy, but
conflicting signals to
prices brought investmen
sources to a standstill.
can be extended when one
In the case of energy, a
Long-term efficiency requires
in conservation and alternative
energy prices fluctuate and send
firms. The 1982 decline in oil
t in conservation and alternative
The analogy to the office market
considers the role of government.
sensible role for government is to
tax energy, to maintain a high price and send consistent
signals to firms. One could similarly argue that
government should tax office space in central business
districts to reduce congestion by encouraging the
relocation of routine office functions. This would ration
scarce downtown sites to those functions that most need a
central location. 1 7
III.The Outer Boroughs Versus the Suburbs
New York City is in an unenviable postion. Some degree
of dispersal of offices out of Manhattan is both inevitable
due to the costs of congestion and desirable due to the
need to reduce the disparity of employment opportunity
within the city. The question is to what extent this
dispersed office space can be captured in the outer
boroughs of New York City. The suburbs offer stiff
competition to the outer boroughs for low-rent office
space. There is a huge prime office space market in place
13
term efficiency.
in many suburban locations, for example, while there have
been virtually no major office developments in the four
outer boroughs since World War II.
When considering comparative locational advantages, it
is misleading to contrast the suburbs with the outer
boroughs as if these were homogeneous entities. There is
no typical suburban site anymore than there is a typical
outer-borough site. The suburbs offer a bewildering
diversity of locations, from downtown Stamford, to rural
New Jersey, from Newark to Scarsdale. The same is true of
the outer boroughs, which include vast expanses in
industrial parks, such as Spring Creek in Brooklyn, or
dense business districts, such as St. George, Staten
Island, or downtown Brooklyn. The issue then becomes not
whether a firm prefers the suburbs or the outer boroughs,
but instead the specific locational characteristics desired
that may be found in the suburbs, in the outer boroughs, or
both.
Several city officials, especially at the Public
Development Corporation, have argued that in order to
compete with the suburbs, the outer boroughs must offer
suburban-style sites. To begin with, such a view embodies
the misleading notion that there is some typical suburban
office site. But even if we provisionally accept the
proposition that the typical suburban site is a large,
campus-style, low-rise office park at the intersection of
two major highways, the implications of such a popular
14
suburban site are by no means cl
site that makes it attractive?
the highway? Are the buildings
is cheap, or because low-rise
firms move to the countrysidE
security? The simple f
office parks does not tel
The debate about the r
the suburbs and the c
exclusively on speculati
hypothesize that firms f
feature a higher income r
offer anecdotes about r
Stamford because the cha
moved out of Manhattan b
Many of these theories
ear. What is it about this
Do firms want the view, or
low-rise because the land
are more convenient? Do
for the beauty, or for
act of the popularity of these
1 us why they are popular.
elative comparative advantages of
outer boroughs relies almost
on and anecdotal evidence. Some
avor suburban sites because they
esidential environment. Others
elocation: this firm moved to
irman lives there; or that firm
ecause the president was robbed.
and anecdotes are, no doubt,
plausible. The question is whether they can be tested
empirically, and what such tests might tell us about the
determinants of office location. An empirical analysis may
be able to inform the debate about office development in
the outer boroughs in three ways: (1) to judge the ability
of the outer boroughs, in general, to compete with the
suburbs for offices; (2) to judge which specific types of
locations within a given borough are most likely to attract
development; and (3) to judge what tax abatements,
subsidies and other incentives are likely to influence
office location. No argument is made that an empirical
15
analysis can offer any solutions to the vexing policy
issues facing New York. The location of offices affects
the distribution of employment and income, and these
consequences may be more important than the simple
development potential of a site. A study of locational
determinants may tell us whether a site is attractive to
developers, but it can tell us nothing about whether the
site should be developed.
IV. An Analysis of the Determinants of Office Location
A. Introduction
Most office buildings are built on speculation by
real estate developers who must anticipate the growth in
employment and demand for office space. This speculation
is often based on a very sketchy analysis of future demand,
as evidenced by the chronic oversupplies of office space in
many cities.1 8  Profits in real estate can be very
handsome,. and tax laws in the United States encourage
equity partnership in real estate development. 1 9 Office
development in New York is extremely cyclical in character.
As one observer wrote: "Inadequate information and long
lead time for construction distort the relationship between
supply and demand, which is uneven and often appears to
verge on the irrational." 2 0  The office market, thus,
appears to approximate the famous hog-market disequilibrium
of economic theory. If the office market is a boom-bust
performance, then we would expect vacancy rates to fall
16
very low during the boom and rise very high during the bust
-- which is, in fact, what happens. In Manhattan, the
vacancy rate fell to 0.5 percent in 1967-68, but rose to
14.6 percent in 1972.21
One reason for this cyclical pattern is the long
lag between the conception of a project and its completion.
The two to three-year lead time for a project means that
the supply of office space cannot immediately respond to
changes in demand. Moreover, once an office building is
completed, it cannot be quickly converted to an alternative
use if demand falls. What do immediately respond to
changes in demand are the vacancy rate and the rent. High
demand, assuming a fixed supply in the short term, causes
vacancy rates to fall and rents to be bid up. Short-term
rents, then, will tend to be determined by demand
characteristics, since supply is fixed.
We began our analysis by selecting the 47 towns
that account for most of the suburban New York office space
market and for which office rents by building were
available. Since the outer boroughs are thought to be
competing with the suburbs, and since the Manhattan office
market is not comparable, we restricted our study to the
suburban office market. We obtained rents per square foot
and the total number of square feet for each of 278
buildings. There is no census of office buildings in
suburban New York. Our sample, though, was from the most
comprehensive inventory available, an inventory that
17
included approximately 1800 buildings. From these we
calculated a weighted mean rent for each town by dividing
the total rents by the total square footage (see Table 5).
Since our interest is in new, prime office space, we
included only buildings in excess of 40,000 sq. ft. We
lacked data on the age of the buildings, so we excluded
buildings with rents below 10 dollars per sq. ft on the
assumption that rents below this correspond to old,
inferior office stock. One would expect, on such an
assumption, to find such low rents only in very old office
districts such as in Bridgeport, Connecticut, or Newark,
New Jersey - which was in fact the case.2 2
We sought to explain the variations in rent across
towns by a variety of factors relating to cost
differentials and to amenity differentials. Since we are
assuming that the supply of office space is fixed in the
short term, we expect that rents will vary according to the
demand for amenities in a particular town. Towns that are
more desirable places to work and live should have office
rents bid up by the willingness to pay for locational
amenities. If supply is indeed fixed in the short term,
then we would expect cost factors to have little effect on
the variations in rents.
B. The Variables and Some Diagnostics
The cost variables included the following:
(1) Two measures of the height of buildings in a
18
given town: The mean number of stories, and the proportion
of buildings in a given town with more than eight stories.
The taller a building, the more costly it is to construct
per square foot, and building above 8 stories is thought to
be significantly more costly than building under 8
stories.23
(2) Electricity costs, given by the average
monthly electric bill for firms using approximately 150,000
kilowatt hours (see Table 2). Since virtually all rents
included in the sample were gross (include utilities), the
cost of electricity should be reflected in the rents.
(3) The distance to Manhattan in miles as a proxy
for transportation costs. In classical location theory, as
one moves away from the central business district,
transport costs to that district increase, so that rents
decrease accordingly.
(4) Effective commercial property tax rates, in
dol lars per hundred assessed val uation. There is
theoretical agr
property tax.
rents could i
differences in
the absence of
the difference
Alternatively,
tax and rents may
eement about the incidence of the commercial
A significantly positive correlation with
ndicate that the inter-jurisdictional
taxes were passed on to the tenants, while
any correlation with rents might mean that
s in taxes were borne by the landlord. 2 4
a positive correlation between the property
mean that towns with significant
locational advantages could raise their commercial property
19
no
taxes to capture some of the value of those locational
advantages.25 Our study is not adequate to contribute to
the debate on property tax incidence, and only notes the
issues.
(5) Labor costs, no measure. The labor costs of
constructing and operating office buildings are no doubt
substantial, but there are probably not significant
differences in labor costs among suburbs in the New York
metropolitan region. The cost of labor probably differs
between New York City and its suburbs (see Table 3), but
probably not among suburbs.
The amenity variables included the following:
(1) Effective residential property tax rates, in
dollars per hundred assessed valuation. We hypothesize
that executives choose office locations in places where
they either live or would like to. We thus expect a
negative correlation with rents, since high residential
property taxes are a disamenity.
(2) Commuter rail access to Manhattan, a
categorical variable of either yes or no. Rail access to
Manhattan is assumed to be an amenity.
(3) Location by state, a categorical variable for
New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Although many
factors may vary by state, we hypothesize that the most
important is personal income taxes. Personal income taxes,
unlike corporate income taxes, vary widely across our three
states. Since state income taxes differ by kind of income
20
taxed, and not simply in degree, a categorical variable is
the best way to attempt to capture this effect. Executives
who make locational decisions are assumed to be very
concerned with the state personal income tax, and a low tax
rate would be a major amenity (see Table 2).
(4) Socio-economic stratification, or "living
with the right kind of people." We expect that managers
and top coroporate officials prefer to live and work near
people of a similar class, race, and occupation. So
residential amenity is measured by several proxies
including the proportion of residents who are black; the
percentage change in population from 1970-1980 (to measure
"white flight"); the proportion of adults over 25 years old
who have completed high school; the median per capita
income; the median family income; the proportion of the
residents under the poverty level; the number of clerical
workers, and their proportion of the workforce; and the
number of managers and their proportion of the workforce.
A highly desirable location is hypothesized to be one where
the residents are predominately white, well-educated, high
income, and in managerial occupations.
(5) School quality, as measured by county average
educational expenditures per capita. Executives are
assumed to regard high quality schools as an amenity. Our
measure of school quality, though, is very poor.
The correlation matrix provided important
information about both the bivariate relation between
21
independent and dependent variables, and about
relationships among the independent variables (see Table
4). The correlations between the average rent and our
independent variables displayed one interesting pattern:
the amenity variables were consistently more highly
correlated with the average rent than were the cost
variables. Although this pattern could disappear in the
multiple regressions, it suggests that amenity factors are
better predictors for rents than are cost factors. The
possibility cannot be excluded, however, that this result
derives solely from poor data on cost factors. Perhaps
more important are the correlations among the independent
variables. Since our variables include several different
measures of the same factor, we would expect these to have
a high degree of correlation. Median family income and
median per capita income, for example, have a correlation
of .941; the proportion of residents who are black has a
.715 correlation with the proportion below the poverty
level. To avoid redundancy, or in statistical parlance,
colinearity, we must not use two measures of the same
phenomenon. On the basis of these preliminary diagnostics,
we chose the most promising variables (see Table 1).
The mean rent for each town was derived from a
sample of buildings located in that town, and weighted by
the number of square feet. Since the number of square feet
differed in each town, we have varying degrees of
confidence in the estimated average rents. Larger samples,
22
ceteris paribus, mean better predictions, so we need to
give more weight to towns with a larger number of square
feet of office space in our sample of buildings. Given our
definition of mean rent, and assuming that rents per sq. ft
by building have constant variance, then weighted least
squares is the appropriate model-building technique (see
Table 5).
C. The Cost Model
Our first task was to predict rents on the basis
of cost factors. We assumed that the costs of constructing
taller buildings and the costs of electricity (since these
are gross rents) would certainly be reflected in the rents.
The incidence of commercial property taxes is a more
complex issue. If supply is, in fact, fixed in the short
run, then we would expect the tax to be borne by the
landlord. From this assumption, we would predict no
correlation between rents and commercial property taxes. A
significantly positive correlation between rents 'and
property taxes could indicate that supply is not completely
inelastic in the short run, and taxes are, at least in
part, shifted forward to the tenants. Finally, the rent
gradient of classical location theory leads us to expect a
negative correlation between rents and the distance to
Manhattan.
Our first model predicts rents as an additive
function of the average stories of buildings, the costs of
electricity and the commercial property tax rate.
23
The estimated coefficients are:
(1) rent = 16.384 + .459 (average stories)
(4.580) (2.360)
+ .249(electricity costs) - 1.641(commercial tax)
(.782) (-3.395)
(The figures in parentheses under the
coefficients are T-ratios)
dgf = 43 r 2 = .259
The coefficient for electricity costs is not
significantly different from zero at the .05 level. The
principal difficulty with this model is the negative
coefficient for the commercial property tax. No matter
what assumptions are made about incidence, a significantly
negative correlation is difficult, if not impossible, to
explain. We will argue later that this negative relation
can be understood only when we assume that what is really
being measured is the residential property tax rate.
Another shortcoming of this model is that it only explains
about 26 percent of the variations in rents.
Our second model attempts to see if these
predictive relations remain constant if we control for
distance by adding it to our first model.
The estimated coefficients are:
(2) rent = 16.739 + .461(average stories)
(4.517) (2.346)
+ .269(electricity costs) - 1.697(commercial tax)
(.828) (-3.359)
- .017 (distance)
(-.429)
dgf = 42 r2 = .263
24
Neither distance nor electricity cost coefficients
are significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for the
commercial property tax remains difficult to interpret as a
commercial tax. Since the coefficients for electricity
costs and distance are essentially zero, we decided to drop
them from the model.
Our third model, then, predicts rents as an
additive function of the average stories and the commercial
property tax.
The estimated coefficients are:
(3) rent = 19.007 + .429(average stories)
(15.410) (2.261)
- 1.405(commercial tax)
(-3.738)
dgf = 44 . r2 = .249
Comparing the r2 statistic with those of previous
models shows that these two variables account for
essentially all of the explanatory power of the previous
models. Still, even though both of our coefficients are
statistically significant,this in no way implies that they
are substantively significant. In particular, we are
forced to assume that the commercial tax coefficient is
measuring something else. Because of these substantial
interpretive problems, we thought it useful to omit this
commercial tax variable, and fit a model with variables
that we could interpret.
Our fourth model predicts rents as an additive
function of electricity costs, the average stories and the
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distance to Manhattan.
The estimated coefficients are:
(4) rent = 20.889 - .423(electricity costs)
(5.358) (-1.510)
+ .141(average stories) + .018(distance)
(.738) (.403)
dgf = 43 r2 = .060
Here none of the coefficients is significant at
the .05 level, and the explained variations in rents is
less than 1 percent. It appears that the explanatory power
of the previous models and the significance of the average
stories coefficient depended on the commercial property
tax. Yet the commercial property tax coefficient is not
interpretable and may be measuring the residential property
tax. Our cost factors appear to have almost no explanatory
power. This result does not prove, but is consistent with
our assumption that short-term supply is fixed. The
possibility remains that these results are due to poor data
or that we are measuring the wrong cost factors.
D. The Amenity Model
Our second task was to predict rents on the basis
of amenity factors. With supply fixed in the short run,
the variations in rents should stem from shifts in the
demand curve due to a willingness to pay for a desirable
location. So we would expect that more desirable locations
could command higher rents than less desirable locations.
What constitutes a desirable location? We assume that
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executives, like everyone, prefer short trips to work
rather than long ones. So they would like to locate their
offices in a town where they live or would like to live.
And executives also want their offices to locate in
prestigious and fashionable places where, in short, other
large firms have located. From these assumptions we would
expect a desirable town to have a high socio-economic
profile, but also have a fashionable office district. We
assume that it requires a certain critical mass of managers
to make a town fashionable, so we used the variable for the
number of managers. A large clerical workforce might also
be thought desirable, though such a clerical workforce
would reduce the high-income profile of the town. Finally,
executives are assumed to prefer lower residential property
taxes to higher.
Our first model predicts rents as an additive
function of the residential property tax rate, the number
of managers, the number of clerical workers, and the median
income per capita.
The estimated coefficients are:
(1) rent = 13.802 - 1.333(residential tax)
(12.484) (-4.219)
+ 2.440(managers) - .263(clerical)
(8.073) (-2.673)
+ .258(median income)
(2.798)
dgf = 42 r2 = .844
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All of our coefficients are significantly
different from zero at the .05 level, and the model expains
84 percent of the variations in rents.
Since this model uses the number of managerial and
clerical workers instead of their proportions of the
workforce, there is a chance that we are in fact just
measuring the effects of the size of the town on rents.
Our correlation matrix shows high correlations between
population size and both managers (.755) and clerical
(.971) workers (see Table 4). Because of this danger of
colinearity, we decided to control for population size and
see if our occupational groups retain any independent
explanatory power.
Our second model, then, simply adds the population
size to the first model.
The estimated coefficients are:
(2) rent = 13.802 - 1.333(residential tax)
(12.331) (-4.164)
+ .258(median income) + .000(population)
(2.757 (-.008)
+ 2.439(managers) - .261(clerical)
(7.772) 2 (-1.027)
dgf = 41 r = .844
It is remarkable just how similar this model is to
the previous one -- except that the coefficients for
population and the number of clerical workers
simultaneously become insignificantly different from zero
at the .05 level. The number of clerical workers appears
to exert no independent explanatory power apart from the
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size of the population. The number of managers, however,
appears to retain a significant predictive power even after
controlling for population size. It is not, then, simply
the size of a town that makes it desirable for offices, but
the size of the managerial population. Such a result does
not prove, but is consistent with, the theory that firms
desire fashionable locations.
Our third model summarizes these findings, and
predicts rents as an additive function of the residential
property tax rate, the median income per capita, the
population, and the number of managers.
(3) rent = 13.695 - 1.406(residential tax)
(12.280) (-4.503)
+ .289(median income) - .018(population)
(3.272) (-2.431)
+ 2.267(managers)
(8.537)
dgf = 42 r2 = .840
These coefficients can be interpreted as a
willingness to pay for certain amenities. Other things
equal, firms are willing to pay in rent per square foot:
1.41 dollars for every one dollar reduction in the
residential property tax rate, 29 cents for every 1000
dollar increase in the median income, 2 cents for every
1000 reduction in population, and 2.27 dollars for every
1000 increase in managers.
The negative relationship of population to rents
poses an interpretive question. Why should an increase in
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population reduce rents? To begin with, the bivariate
correlation of rent and population is slightly positive
(.120). But this positive correlation seems to be
measuring the positive relation between rents and the
number of managers. So a larger population does mean
higher rents insofar as a larger population indicates more
managers. But once we control for the number of managers,
the relation between population and rents turns negative
and is significant at the .05 level. This makes sense when
we consider that the larger cities in metropolitan New York
tend to be older, declining industrial cities with a large
proportion of poor, black residents. We immediately think
of the large cities in our sample, such as Newark, New
Brunswick, Elizabeth, and Bridgeport. The correlation
matrix confirms our intuition: population has a -. 409
correlation with median income, and at .440 correlation
with the proportion of blacks. Given that population is
positively correlated with all of these -- from the
perspective of managers -- disamenities, it is not
surprising that population is negatively related to rents.
Although corporate income taxes do not vary
significantly by state, personal income taxes vary widely
(see Table 2). This suggests that while costs do not vary
by state, amenities for executives do. In an attempt to
test for these personal income tax differentials, we
decided to include a categorical variable for location by
state.
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Our fourth model simply added the state
categorical variables to the third model.
The estimated coefficients are:
(4) rent = 13.740 - 1.024(residential tax)
(9.141) (-2.339)
+ .296(median income) - .016(population)
(3.572) (-2.088)
+ 1.822(managers) + 1.830(Connecticut)
(6.006) (3.055)
- .722(New Jersey) - 1.108(New York)
(-1.616 (-5.472)
dgf = 40 r2 = .873
Although categorical variables do not tell us why
a category has predictive power, the coefficients of these
state categories are quite consistent with our theory of
the importance of personal income taxes on location
amenity. Connecticut has a strong positive effect on
rents, and is the only state of the three that does not tax
earned income; New York levies the most progressive income
tax and has the most negative effect on rents; and New
Jersey's coefficient is between the other two, as is its
income tax. Moreover, a general F-test between the two
hierarchically related models 3 and 4, yields an F-ratio of
5.0925 which is significant at the .05 level. The state
effects, thus, are statistically significant as well as
substantively significant.
V. The Amenity Orientation of Office Location
Amenity factors appear to predict rents much more
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powerfully than do cost factors. We will argue that there
are a number of good reasons for this to be so. Beginning
with the most specific considerations, we will move to more
general explanations of why amenity factors should be the
best predictors.
A. Specifics of the Cost Model
The negative coefficient attached to the
commercial property tax rate posed significant interpretive
problems. No matter how we view the question of incidence,
this negative relation is difficult to explain. The
correlation matrix shows a .865 correlation between
commercial and residential property tax rates. This fact,
combined with the straightforward interpretation of the
negative residential property tax coefficient, leads us to
believe that what the commercial property tax variable is
measuring, if anything, is the residential property tax.
As a final test of colinearity, we added the commercial
property tax rate to our fourth amenity model. The
coefficients for both property tax rates became
insignificant at the .05 level. This convinced us that
colinearity was the problem.
The insignificance of our distance coefficient is
consistent with other recent theoretical and empirical
research on the rent gradient. In classical location
theory, rents diminish as distance from the central
business district grows. The decline in rents is thought
to compensate for the increased travel costs to the center
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city. A weakness of this model has always been its rather
heroic assumptions: (1) There is a flat undifferentiated
transport surface making travel equally costly in any
direction; (2) all production and distribution in a
metropolitan area take place in the central business
district; and (3) the costs of construction and maintenance
must be uniform throughout the region. Although no
metropolitan area has ever approximated these assumptions,
recent developments in the intra-metropolitan distribution
of economic activity especially weaken the plausibility of
the gravity model. Suburbanization has caused metropolitan
areas to become increasingly multinuclear, weakening the
attraction exerted by the core city. Empirical studies of
urban land-value gradients over time show that the gravity
model is losing predictive power.
As a result of the dispersion of business activity
and the growth of other centers, distance from the
central business district is gradually losing its
once commanding power to explain intra-
metropolitan variation in site value. 2 6
The dispersal of economic activity throughout
metropolitan New York lessens the need and thus the cost of
travel to New York City. All of which tends to flatten the
rent gradient, which may help explain the insignificance of
our distance coefficient.
B. Amenities and Monopolistic Competition
We have assumed that in the short run, supply is
fixed, while demand shifts according to the desirability of
a location. Implicit is the view that the supply, office
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space, is a homogeneous product distinct from the amenities
of its location. Yet it is plausible to think of office
space not as homogeneous, but as differentiated according
to the amenities of its location. Many commodities are
differentiated by reputation, quality, or fashion. Just as
a suit from Brooks Brothers is not the same commodity as a
suit from Macy's, so an office in Greenwich is not the same
commodity as an office in Jersey City. Supply in
monopolistic competition cannot simply be measured in
physical quantities, since the product supplied has diverse
qualities.
In the short run, the supply of office stock is
fixed under monopolistic competition, as it is in our
model. But if the office-space market is characterized by
monopolistic competition, this has long-term consequences
for rent differentials across towns. If we assume that
office space is a homogeneous product, then with supply
fixed in the short-run, demand can bid up rents. In the
long run, however, supply should increase to meet demand,
and rents should fall to an equilibrium level. Yet, we
observe long-run rent differentials between, for example,
Greenwich and Jersey City. Why does supply not increase
over time in Greenwich to lower rents to the level of
Jersey City? The reason is that for monopolistic
competition, in addition to short-term fixity in supply,
there is a long-term fixity. Product differentiation gives
the seller control over a scarce resource -- the prestige
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of the product. Insofar as people are willing to pay more
for the prestigious location, then the seller can for a
long time command a higher rent. Prestige and reputation
are scarce resources, and their owners can earn long-term
profits from them. If Brooks Brothers can convince people
that their suits are unique, then increasing the supply of
other-make suits will not necessarily lower the price of a
Brooks Brothers suit. Prestigious office locations in
Greenwich are scarce resources, and their owners can
command higher rents in the long term because they provide
a different product. Eventually, it is true, fashions
change, new prestigious locations emerge. Market power to
raise prices diminishes.
Our model examines only short-term rent
determination and cannot prove or disprove the hypothesis
of a monopolistically competitive office market. Yet,
since amenities are the basis of product differentiation,
our amenity- oriented model is at least consistent with the
theory of monopolistic competition.
C. Amenities and Office Location Theory
Cost models of firm location were developed by
geographers such as Weber (1909), Losch (1954), and Isard
(1956), primarily to explain industrial location.
Manufacturing firms are thought to choose an optimal
location with respect to markets on the one hand and
factors of production on the other. Because shipping raw
materials to the plant and processed commodities from the
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plant is expensive, location is thought to be fairly
sensitive to costs. Yet these cost-oriented models do not
make as much sense in the case of offices, since it is
difficult to measure the locational costs of office
functions such as decision-making. Malamud argues that
"office location is perceived to be less sensitive to costs
than are most economic activities." 2 7
Since the costs of any location are often small
and intangible, locational decisions are typically made by
tradition and fashion.
There is no process of accounting that can weigh
the enhancement in quality of executive decision-
making in a given locatio 8 against the costs of
operating at that location.
In addition, the greater mobility of offices in
comparison with manufacturing plants means that the costs
are smaller of choosing a poor locat-ion.
Surveys of executives who make locational
decisions are another window on the determinants of office
location. Since little quantitative evidence is available
on the costs and benefits of alternative sites, "executives
must base location decisions on vague and personal ideas
rather than on hard financial data". 2 9  The very
uncertainty about the costs of alternative sites may
contribute to the trendiness or "swarming," as executives
feel that they are minimizing the risks of choosing a poor
location by staying with the crowd. 3 0 Many surveys reveal
that proximity to executive residences is often a key
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influence on location
International surveys
influence decisions to
in Sydney, London, and New York. 3 1
also reveal that push factors
move to the suburbs. These urban
di sameni t
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decisions.
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ies include congestion, lack of room for
and high rents. In a survey of major English-
tions, only American executives mentioned a poor
rban environment as a factor in relocation
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in American, British, and Australian cities. 3 2
ere have been no good studies of the influence
on location decisions, even though real estate
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Surveys of executives find prestige menti
with respect to relocation. 3 4 The tendency
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financial institutions. Banks may favor
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characterizes
office-location decisions, the equilibrium-cost models of
industrial location theory remain highly influential. Some
researchers like Malamud endeavor to create neoclassical
equilibrium models for office location in which
communication costs are analogous to transportation costs
in the industrial location model. Yet the pervasive
evidence of the importance of subjective factors,
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prejudice, and ignorance of alternatives in office-location
decisions throws considerable doubt on the possibility of
developing an office-location model within the context of
industrial location theory. 3 6
Given the centrality of personal preference in
office location, household location theory should offer a
more satisfactory theoretical context than industrial
location theory for understanding office location.
Traditional household location theory assumed that upper
income households moved to the suburbs because they
preferred the benefit of extra land more than the costs of
extra commuting.37 But recent research by Wheaton
indicates that extra land is actually valued less than the
costs of commuting. He concluded that the demand for land
does not explain migration to the suburbs; instead, he
suggested that people are drawn to the suburbs by lower
taxes and amenities, such as school quality. 3 8 Tiebout was
the first to argue that households examine local fiscal
advantages when choosing residential location. Oates then
tested Tiebout's hypothesis by assuming that net fiscal
residuals (i.e., the difference between taxes paid and
services received) attract households, raising the demand
for housing and land and bidding up their prices. Oates
found evidence that property values are positively
correlated with local expenditure and negatively correlated
with the local tax rate. 3 9  Oates model of household
location is quite similar to our model of office location.
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Where he found residential property taxes negatively
correlated with property value, we found the same negative
correlation between residential property taxes and office
rents. Reschovsky also found residential property taxes
negatively correlated with household location. 4 0 What is
significant for our purposes is the consistency of these
theories and findings with our amenity model of office
location. The causal link between household location
models and our office location model is the preferences of
executives. Not surprisingly, corporate officials prefer
to locate offices in places where they reside or would like
to reside.
VI. Public Policy and Office Location
A. A Role for Government?
Before we turn to some of the public policy
implications of our findings, we should examine the issue:
why should government intervene in office location, why not
let the market function freely? We believe that government
intervention can be justified on the basis of
externalities. There is reason to believe that although
the costs to firms may not differ much across locations,
the costs to society differ considerably. Government has a
legitimate role in reducing the divergence between the
private costs and the social costs for many office
locations. Campus-style suburban office sites are a good
example. Built along major highways, these office parks
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have become very popular locations. Typically, state and
local governments assume the costs of sewers, utilities,
and highway expansion to accomodate these sites. Offices
are major traffic generators, and the cost of increased
highway capacity is enormous -- and is borne by the public.
By contrast, location in a regional subcenter, such as
Newark, Stamford, and Bridgeport, creates fewer external
costs since the infrastructure is already in place. A
private firm, however, has no incentive to choose the
regional subcenter since the costs associated with the
campus site are not borne by the firm.
The Regional Plan Association conducted a survey
of office employees to estimate the relative magnitude of
the transportation costs among office locations in
Manhattan, regional subcenters, and suburban campus sites.
For firms moving from Manhattan to a campus site, travel
time to work is reduced, but total travel time (including
lunch trips, etc.) remains constant. The reduction in
travel time to work is most pronounced for executives --
which throws light on why offices move to the suburbs. The
reduced travel time to work, however, is achieved at the
cost of much greater energy use: "The transportation
energy use per employee at campus sites is virtually double
that of Manhattan locations." 4 1 Differences in the mode of
transport explain the disparity in energy use: campus
sites rely on auto use, while Manhattan relies on transit.
At regional subcenters, the energy use per employee is
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halfway between the Manhattan low and the campus high.
Such dramatic contrasts in energy use suggest some of the
social costs incurred by different office locations. To
encourage energy conservation, government has a sound
economic justification for regulating office location.
B. The Dilemmas of Office Development
We can now turn to the question: what do our
findings tell us about New York City's efforts to stimulate
office development in the outer boroughs?
Our model indicated that in the short run, due to
the assumed fixity in supply, costs had little bearing on
the determination of rents. About the long-run importance
of costs, our model tells us nothing directly. Nonetheless,
many geographers have concluded that even in the long run,
office location is not very sensitive to costs and seems to
be fashion and amenity oriented. And if the office market
is monopolistically competitive, then costs would have a
secondary role in determining even long-run rents. All of
this casts doubt on the efficacy of tax abatements,
subsidies, and other incentives for stimulating office
development in the outer boroughs. Commercial property
taxes are higher in Westchester County, for example, than
in the outer boroughs of New York City, yet office
developers far prefer Westchester. 4 2
The amenity orientation of office location has, in
general, grave implications for the outer boroughs. While
there are enormous differences among and within boroughs,
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overall, the outer boroughs have a much less desirable
socioeconomic profile -- from the perspective of corporate
executives -- than does, say, Fairfield County.
Residential property taxes in the outer boroughs are lower
than in suburban New York State, though higher than
Fairfield County.43 It is not clear, however, what can be
done about this. With the preponderance of apartments in
New York City, lowering residential property taxes would
benefit landlords, but not necessarily tenants.
Quite simply, the poverty, blight and crime of
many parts of the outer boroughs -- especially the Bronx
and Brooklyn -- are a formidible obstacle to office
development. Moreover, state and local governments lack
the resources required to create a decent environment in
New York City; the federal government, meanwhile, cannot
afford both the military budget and the reconstruction of
our cities. The outer boroughs would appear to have more
promise if costs were the key determinant of office
location, for New York City is in a much better position to
reduce development costs than to make the outer boroughs
attractive places to live and work.
Our findings pose a number of dilemmas for office
development in the outer boroughs.
First, if executives will tend to prefer the
amenities of the suburbs, then back-office development may
offer the most promise for the outer boroughs, since
routine functions involve few executives. Unfortunately,
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back-office functions are the most rapidly replaced by new
technologies, and thus offer little potential employment
growth. So the very office functions the boroughs are most
likely to obtain, are the office functions that are least
likely to enhance employment opportunity and stimulate
local borough economies.4 4 The Swedish government
explicitly decided in the 1960s not to relocate back-office
jobs to depressed regions precisely because it was thought
that these jobs would be replaced by automation. Instead,
the Swedes chose to relocate headquarter functions to those
regions. 4 5
Second, if amenities are in fact crucial, then some
boroughs have more promise than other boroughs, and some
locations in a given borough more promise than other
locations. Staten Island and Queens have a higher median
income and a lower unemployment rate than Brooklyn and the
Bronx. Because of this amenity comparative advantage,
Queens and Staten Island may hold more potential for office
location than Brooklyn or the Bronx. Yet it is Brooklyn
and the Bronx that most need new jobs, and appear least
likely to get them. Similarly, within boroughs there are a
variety of potential locations for office development. In
the Bronx, the Fordham Road business district has excellent
transit links to the rest of the city; Baychester Commons,
designated as an office park, in the northern Bronx has
very poor transit access. If a firm desires to isolate
itself from the physical and social disamenities of a
43
borough downtown, the firm may prefer an office park. The
city is, in fact, marketing these office parks for
development. Of course, precisely because the office parks
are isolated from the disamenities of borough downtowns and
lack transit facilities, they are all but inaccessible to
lower-income borough residents. A key characteristic of
lower-income New Yorkers is that they do not own cars, and
jobs created in office parks would almost certainly go to
suburban commuters.
All of this suggests that market locational
determinants, such as executive preferences, will not
necessarily reduce employment disparities between Manhattan
and the outer boroughs, or provide jobs for poor New
Yorkers. Office development in borough downtowns is
preferable to location in office parks for two reasons:
first, because downtown jobs are more accessible to low-
income people; and second, because the external costs borne
by the city of development in office parks -- where
infrastructure must be provided -- could be substantial.
The fact that the city has good reasons to regulate office
location, however, by no means implies that it will. With
so many alternative locations available to developers in
other jurisdictions, the city fears that any attempt to
regulate office location will only lose offices to the
suburbs. If it is to reduce the growing disparities of
employment and income within New York City, the city must
be able to exercise land-use controls to divert office
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development from Manhattan to distressed parts of the outer
boroughs. Yet the exercise of those controls -- and here
is the dilemma -- might only chase offices to the suburbs.
C. What Is To Be Done?
The task of public policy must be to extricate New
York from the vexing dilemmas posed by office development
in the outer boroughs. As we saw, efforts to simply
attract offices to the outer boroughs hold little promise
for genuine economic development. The office jobs
attracted, if any, will be low-growth back-office jobs; and
the sites most attractive to developers are least in need
of development. How satisfactory is economic development
in the outer boroughs that is not likely to provide jobs
for the unemployed residents of those boroughs? Yet the
ability of New York City to use land-use controls and taxes
to divert office growth from Manhattan to the distressed
downtowns of the outer boroughs is undermined by the myriad
political boundaries. The New York metropolitan economy
spans over portions of three states and includes more than
a dozen suburban counties. Each state levies different
income taxes; every town levies different property taxes.
Firms that need access to Manhattan can locate outside of
New York City, or even outside of New York State, and incur
lower taxes and cheaper land.4 6 So no matter how overbuilt
and congested Manhattan becomes (east Midtown is in near-
permanent gridlock), no matter how unevenly distributed
office employment becomes (83 percent of total New York
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City office space is in Manhattan 4 7 ), the city cannot
regulate office location without fearing the erosion of its
tax base.
What reason is there to believe, however, that
fewer fiscal jurisdictions would enable the City to divert
office growth to the outer boroughs? Although controlled
experiments are not possible in the social sciences (nor in
meteorology or astronomy, for that matter), the experience
of London approximates such a control. As in New York,
office space expanded enormously in central London with its
concommitent crowding and congestion. The Greater London
Council, however, has jurisdiction over all metropolitan
London: the suburbanization of offices, then, does not
erode the tax base. Controls were introduced in 1964 to
limit new office construction in central London. Between
1964 and 1977 an estimated 170,000 to 250,000 office jobs
were dispersed from the center city to the suburbs, owing,
at least in part, to the imposition of controls. 4 8
Regional government and a unified tax jurisdiction would
enable New York to regulate office location wtihout fear of
eroding its tax base. While a Greater New York City
Council is not imminent, the federal government, through
revenue sharing and grants-in-aid, can help reduce the
fiscal disparities that encourage the suburbanization of
households and offices. Only a reduction in the political
balkanization of metropolitan New York will make office
development possible in the distressed business districts
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of the outer boroughs.
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TABLE 1: Data Matrix for Selected Variables
1981 Mean Rent 1980 Pop. 1980
(per (in thou- Median Income
# Town Name sq.ft) sands) (in thousands)
1. Bridgeport $16.168 142.546 $ 6.081
2. Danbury 18.045 60.470 7.957
3. Darien 20.500 18.892 18.153
4. Westport 22.415 25.290 16.925
5. Greenwich 26.612 59.578 16.602
6. Stamford 27.331 102.453 10.719
7. New Haven 15.963 126.109 5.822
8. Englewood Cliffs 17.462 5.698 14.535
9. Fort Lee 19.078 32.449 13.295
10. Hackensack 17.689 36.039 9.462
11. Montvale 15.863 7.318 10.814
12. Paramus 15.385 26.474 9.692
13. Rutherford 16.000 19.068 9.199
14. West Caldwell 12.500 11.407 10.792
15. Roseland 14.871 5.330 11.681
16. Newark 14.511 329.248 4.525
17. West Orange 15.202 39.510 10.837
18. Jersey City 14.146 223.532 5.812
19. Secaucus 15.000 13.719 9.495
20. Lawrenceville 10.000 2.109 12.479
21. Princeton 14.810 12.035 9.502
22. New Brunswick 12.591 41.442 5.782
23. Piscataway 14.090 45.555 7.143
24. Woodbridge 16.987 13.762 10.483
25. Freehold 10.000 10.020 6.957
26. Red Bank 11.222 12.031 8.344
27. Florham Park 14.357 9.359 9.528
28. Morristown 15.792 16.614 9.254
29. Parsippany 14.596 5.305 10.492
30. Toms River 13.000 7.465 4.900
31. Bridgewater 16.595 11.983 10.693
32. Franklin Twp. 14.752 9.710 9.000
33. Elizabeth 14.730 106.201 6.712
34. Springfield 14.000 7.118 11.571
35. Union 12.064 55.593 5.625
36. Garden City 15.241 22.927 13.602
37. Great Neck 14.288 9.168 13.209
38. Lake Success 18.459 2.396 22.495
39. Hempstead 10.500 40.404 7.236
40. Hauppauge 11.839 20.960 8.149
41. Melville 13.897 8.139 9.843
42. Elmsford 10.631 3.361 9.603
43. Rye 19.500 15.083 14.756
44. New Rochelle 22.000 70.794 10.343
45. Scarsdale 14.961 17.650 22.956
46. White Plains 17.153 46.999 10.876
47. Tarrytown 15.890 10.648 10.778
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TABLE 1(cont.)
# Town Name
Commer-
Mean cial
Stories Prop. Tax
Resi-
dential
Prop. Tax
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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# of
Mgrs.
Bridgeport 11.000
Danbury 3.833
Darien 3.000
Westport 3.000
Greenwi.ch 3.100
Stamford 5.852
New Haven 10.333
Englewood Cliffs 2.667
Fort Lee 6.636
Hackensack 6.000
Montvale 1.750
Paramus 3.571
Rutherford 12.000
West Caldwell 2.000
Roseland 3.714
Newark 16.788
West Orange 3.500
Jersey City 12.500
Secaucus 4.667
Lawrenceville 2.000
Princeton 2.688
New Brunswick 6.500
Piscataway 2.600
Woodbridge 5.111
Freehold 5.000
Red Bank 3.500
Florham Park 2.400
Morristown 5.286
Parsippany 3.000
Toms River 3.000
Bridgewater 3.500
Franklin Twp. 3.500
Elizabeth 6.000
Springfield 3.000
Union 2.667
Garden City 4.333
Great Neck 3.545
Lake Success 3.000
Hempstead 7.000
Hauppauge 3.333
Melville 3.538
Elmsford 4.000
Rye 2.000
New Rochelle 17.000
Scarsdale 4.333
White Plains 6.882
Tarrytown 6.000
$2.86
1.15
1.36
2.29
0.85
1.71
3.95
1.47
1.82
2.85
1.71
2.13
3.18
2.86
4.40
6.46
3.50
6.88
3.88
3.12
2.17
4.67
2.96
3.23
2.28
3.71
2.73
2.90
2.50
2.25
3.60
2.74
4.00
3.43
1.53
6.65
5.50
5.04
6.36
4.16
4.30
5.78
5.20
8.30
6.80
4.60
5.50
$2.06
1.58
1.11
1.39
.95
1.60
3.81
1.05
1.69
2.64
1.69
1.62
2.24
2.52
3.12
3.56
3.07
4.25
1.70
1.86
1.73
2.59
1.99
1.81
2.09
2.72
1.46
2.48
1.85
1.91
1.79
2.18
3.00
1.83
1.80
3.34
3.63
3.28
3.70
3.83
3.32
3.77
3.04
3.50
4.44
2.54
3.51
3216
1564
1994
2551
4621
5513
3104
586
2501
1465
421
1560
915
707
237
4647
2117
4948
372
69
405
840
1310
708
337
473
446
624
246
279
505
255
2548
616
1187
2049
717
290
1322
480
320
172
1263
4294
2026
3165
501
Table l(cont.)
*Sources: Mean Rent - Black's Guide 1982
Stories - Black's Guide 1982
Comm. Tax - Center for Local Tax Research
Res. Tax - Center for Local Tax Research
Income - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983
Population - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983
Managers - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972
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Table 2a: 1982 Utility Cost Differentials
in the Region*
KWHR
UTILITY 1,500 10,000 150,000
Con Edison
LILCO
Jersey Central
Power & Light
PSE&G
United Illuminating
Conn. Light & Power
Hartford Electric Light
$ 299 $1,402
170 1,091
171
183
208
193
192
864
930
1,111
978
976
*Source: Edison Electric Institute
TABLE 2b: 1981 Income Tax Differentials in the Reqion*
(1) Corporate Income:
State
Flat
Rate
Federally
Deductible?
New York
New Jersey
Connecticut
(2) Personal Income:
New York: 2% up to $1,000 and 14% above $23,000
New Jersey: 2% up to $20,000 and 2.5% above 20,000
Connecticut: 7% on capital gains. 1-9% on dividends
above $20,000
*Source: The Tax Foundation, Inc.
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STATE
N.Y.
N.J.
CONN.
$19,540
14,527
12,274
12,254
14,962
11,256
11,227
10%
9%
10%
No
No
No
TABLE 3: 1980 Office Building Operating Expenditures*
1. The components of office operating expenditures:
Energy 22%
Cleaning 15%
Real Estate 22%
General Building Costs 10%
Administrative Costs 6%
Other 25%
2. Downtown New York and other major downtown sites (for
1980, in cents per sq.ft):
City
New York
Chicago
Tulsa
San Francisco
Houston
Washington, D.C.
Atlanta
Total Expense
985.6
760.3
543.2
533.9
506.0
491.6
423.1
3. Differentials in operating expenses in cities vs.
suburbs for selected regions (for 1980, in cents per
sq. ft):
Region
Middle Atlantic
Northern Midwest
Southern
Southwest
City
833.4
502
443
481
Suburbs
605.3
516
406
487
*Source: Building Owners and Managers Association
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TABLE 4: Correlation Matrix For Selected Variables*
Mean Rent
Distance
Mean-Rent 1.000 Stories
Distance -0.038 1.000 Comm. Tax
Stories 0.123 -0.141 1.000 Electricity
Comm. Tax -0.223 -0.297 0.506 1.000 Res. Tax
Electricity -0.036 -0.071 0.221 0.666 1.000 Income
Res. Tax -0.338 -0.170 0.399 0.865 0.609 1.000 Population
Income 0.450 -0.189 -0.365 0.023 0.212 -0.055 1.000 Managers
Population 0.120 -0.051 0.740 0.279 -0.066 0.280 -0.409 1.000 Clerical
Managers 0.598 -0.068 0.624 0.176 0.053 0.117 -0.035 0.755 1.000
Clerical 0.114 -0.127 0.732 0.296 -0.069 0.303 -0.413 0.971 0.769 1.000
*Sources: Mean Rent - Black's Guide 1982
Distance - Regional Plan Association, Map of Region
Stories - Black's Guide 1932
Comn. Tax - Center for Local Tax Research
Electricity - Edison Electric Institute
Res. Tax - Center for Local Tax Research
Income - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983
Population - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983
Managers - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972
Clerical - U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972
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TABLE 5: Derivation of Dependent Variable and Its Variance
Derivation of weighted mean rent:
Let ri = rent/sq.ft in building j, town i.
Assume rij has a constant variance: ( )2
Now, mean rent in town i, is given by:
n i
E rij Si
ri= j=l
ni
= sijj=l
= total rent in i
total sq.ft. in i
where si- is the sq.ft for building j in town i
ni = num er of buildings in town i.
Derivation of variance of mean rents:
Then, variance (ri) =
n- 12
E si* var(rij)
j=1
n1 2
= ( G2)
n-
,=12
Therefore, weighted least squares is the appropriate
technique. Assuming rents have a constant variance across
towns, observed mean rents will be heteroskedastic, as
demonstrated in the derivation above.
54
Notes
1. P.W. Daniels, Office Location: An Urban and Regional
Study (London: Bell, 1975), p. 1.
2. Samuel M. Ehrenhalt, "Some Perspectives on the New
York City Economy in a Time of Change," in New York
City's Changing Economic Base ed. Benjamin J. Klebaner
(New York: Pica Press, 1981), p. 13.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Regina B. Armstrong, "National Trends in Office
Construction, Employment and Headquarter Location in
U.S. Metropolitan Areas" in Spatial Patterns of Office
Growth and Location, ed. P.W. Daniels (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1979), p. 64.
5. Ian Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy (New
York: Longman, Inc., 1979), p. 40.
6. Armstrong, "National Trends in Office Construction,
Employment and Headquarter Location in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas," p. 86.
7. Ibid., p. 88.
8. Thomas M. Stanback, Jr.,
Services Transformation" in
Economic Base ed. Benjamin
Pica Press, 1981), p. 53.
"New York City and the
New York City's Changing
J. Klebaner (New York:
9. Ehrenhalt, "Some Perspectives on the New York City
Economy in a Time of Change," p. 15.
10. Elizabeth Dickson, "Changing Commuting Patterns to New
York City," New York City Office of Economic Develop-
ment, 1982.
11. Gail G. Schwartz,,
City, 1960-1975," in
and Location, ed. P
and Sons, 1979), p.
"The Office Pattern in New York
Spatial Patterns of Office Growth
.W. Daniels (New York: John Wiley
229.
12. See, for
Industry:
MA: The
example, Regina B.
Patterns of Growth
MIT Press, 1972), p.
Armstrong,
and Location
2.
The Office
(Cambridge,
13. Schwartz, "The Office Pattern in New York City, 1960-
1975," pp. 224-227.
14. Cited in Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy,
p. 8.
55
"Perspectives on Office Location
Research," in
Location ed.
Sons, 1979),
Spatial Patterns of Office Growth and
P.W. Daniels (New York: John Wiley and
p. 23; and Alexander, Office Location
Public Policy, p. 25.
16. Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy,
17. Such a tax was imposed in
76-78.
18. Ibid.,
19. Schwartz,
Paris, see Alexander, pp.
p. 50.
"The Office Pattern in New York City, 1960-
1975," p. 226.
20. Ibid., p. 215.
21. Ibid., p. 221.
22. See "Black's Guide 82: Suburban
Space Market," published by James
Bank, New Jersey, 1982.
23. According to William C. Wheaton,
thumb among office developers.
Manhattan Office
F. Black, Jr., Red
this is a rule of
24. William C. Wheaton,' "The Incidence of
Jurisdictional Differences in Commercial
Taxes" (December 1981), p. 3.
Inter-
Property
25. James Heilbrun, Urban Economics
York: St. Martin's Press, 198
26. Ibid., p. 148.
27. Cited in Daniels,
Research," p. 4.
and Public
1), p. 461.
"Perspectives on
Policy (New
Office Location
28. Ibid., p. 4.
29. Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy,
30. Ibid.,
31. Ibid.,
32. Ibid., p. 48.
33. Daniels,
p. 14.
"Perspectives on Office Location Research,"
34. Alexander, Office Location and Public
56
p. 54.
p. 52.
p. 52.
p 18.
Policy, p. 50.
15. P.W. Daniels,
35. Daniels, "Perspectives on Office Location Research,"
p. 15.
36. Ibid., p. 4.
37. Michael Wasylenko, "Impacts of the New Federalism on
the Intra-Metropolitan Location of Households and
Firms: A Review of the Evidence on Intra-Metropolitan
Location" (paper prepared for presentation at TRED
Conferences, 1982), p. 23.
38. W.C. Wheaton, "Income and Urban Residence: An Analy-
sis of Consumer Demand for Location," American Eco-
nomic Review 67(1977), pp. 620-631.
39. W.E. Oates, "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local
Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical
Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout
Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy 77 (1969),
pp. 957-970.
40. A. Reschovsky,
lic Sector: An
thesis," Journa
520.
"Residential Choice and the Local
Alternative Test of the Tiebout
L of Urban Economics 6 (1979), pp.
41. Boris Pushkarev and Robert C
Requirements of Alternative Office
Technical Report No. 2, Regional
1983.
Pub-
Hypo-
501-
umella, "Travel
Building Settings,"
Plan Association,
42. Center for Local Tax Research, "Effective Real
Property Tax Rates in the Metropolitan Area of New
York," 1981, pp. 9-12.
43. Ibid., pp. 9-12.
44. Daniels,
p. 16.
"Perspectives on Office Location Research,"
45. Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy, p. 78.
46. Schwartz, "The Office Pattern in New York City, 1960-
1975," p. 216.
47. Ibid., p. 218.
48. Alexander, Office Location and Public Policy, p. 65.
57
Bibliography
Alexander, Ian. Office Location and Public Policy, New
York: Longman Inc., 1979.
Alonso, William. "Location Theory,"
eds. John Friedman and William Alonso.
MIT Press, 1975.
in Regional Policy,
Cambridge, MA: The
Armstrong, Regina B.
struction, Employmen
Metropol itan Areas,"
and Location, ed. P.W.
Sons, 1979.
"National Trends
t and Headquarter
in Spatial Patterns
Daniels. New York:
in Office Con-
Location in U.S.
of Office Growth
John Wiley and
Armstrong, Regina B. The Office Industry: Patterns of
Growth and Location, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972.
Black's Guide
Published by
1982.
82: Suburban Manhattan Office Space Market.
James F. Black, Jr., Red Bank, New Jersey,
Building Owners and
"Experience and Exchange
Carlton,
Economet
Regional
D.C.: The
Managers Association (BOMA).
Report, 1981."
Dennis W. "Why Do Firms Locate Where They Do: An
ric Model," in Interregional Movements and
Growth, ed. Williaii C. Wheton. Washington,
Urban Institute, 1979.
Center For Local Tax Research. "Effective Real Property
Tax Rates in the Metropolitan Area of New York," Nov. 1979,
Nov. 1981.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
Taxes," 1982.
"1982 Guidebook to New York
Daniels, P.W. "Perspectives on Office Location Research,"
in Spatial Patterns of Office Growth and Location, ed. P.W.
Daniels. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
Daniels, P.W.
Study. London:
Office Location: An Urban and .Regional
Bell, 1975.
Edison Electric Institute.
cial and Industrial Bills
Winter 1982.
Ehrenhalt, Samuel M. "Some
City Economy in a Time of
Changing Economic Base, ed.
York: Pica Press, 1981.
"Typical Residential, Commer-
- Investor-Owned Utilities,"
Perspectives on the New York
Change," in New York City's
Benjamin J. Klebaner. New
58
Goddard, J.B. "Office Development and Urban and Regional
Development in Britain," in Spatial Patterns of Office
Growth and Location, ed. P.W. Daniels. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1979.
Heilbrun, James. Urban Economics and Public Policy. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
Oates, W.E. "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local
Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of
Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of
Political Economy 77, 1969.
Pushkarev, B. and Cumella, R, "Travel Requirements of
Alternative Office Building Settings," Technical Report No.
2, Regional Plan Association, 1983.
Reschovsky, A. "Residential Choice and the Local Public
Sector: An Alternative Test of the Tiebout Hypothesis,"
Journal of Urban Economics 6, 1979.
Schwartz, Gail. "The Office Pattern in New York City, 1960-
75," in Spatial Patterns of Office Growth and Location, ed.
P.W. Daniels. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
Stanback, Thomas M., Jr. "New York City and the Services
Transformation," in New York City's Changing Economic Base,
ed. Benjamin J. Klebaner. New York: Pica Press, 1981.
State of New Jersey. "Annual Report of the Division of
Taxation of the Dept. of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year
of 1981."
The Tax Foundation, Inc. "Facts and Figures on Government
Finance," 1981.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 1980 Census of Population and
Housing: Summary Characteristics for Governmental Units and
SMSAs: New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, 1982.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 1980 Census of Population, General
Population Characteristics: New York, New Jersey,
Connecticut, 1982.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 1970 Census of Population, General
Population Characteristics: New York, New Jersey, Connec-
ticut, 1972.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 1977 Census of Governments:
Compendium of Government Finances, 1979.
59
Wasylenko, Michael. "Impacts of the New Federalism on the
Intra-Metropolitan Location of Households and Firms: A
Review of the Evidence on Intra-Metropolitan Location"
(Paper prepared for presentation at TRED Conferences,
1982).
Wheaton, William C. "Income
Analysis of Consumer Demand
Economic Review, 67, 1977.
and Urban Residence: An
for Location," American
Wheaton, William C. "The Incidence of Inter-Jurisdictional
Differences in Commercial Property Taxes" (unpublished
working paper, Department of Economics, MIT), December
1981.
60
